This paper examines how the price and quantity of treatment for privately insured patients are related to expansions in Medicaid eligibility. A theoretical model shows that when hospitals face an increasing number of Medicaid patients, the quantity of private treatment will decrease. When new Medicaid patients previously did not have insurance, private prices theoretically increase. The predictions of the model are tested using hospital level data in California. Between 2000 and 2013, California implemented county level health insurance programs aimed at increasing health insurance coverage for low-income, uninsured individuals. First stage regressions show that the county health insurance programs signi…cantly increase the treatment of county insured patients. The increase in county insured patients increase the average revenue from private patients received at for-pro…t hospitals. The results provide insight as to how the current Medicaid expansion, spearheaded by the A¤ordable Care Act, will impact private patients. More generally, the analysis shows that increasing the quantity of …xed marginal revenue consumers leads to higher prices for consumers facing market prices.
Recent research …nds that health care providers change their behavior following expansions in Medicaid eligibility to speci…c population groups such as individuals with a disability (Wagner, 2015a ) and children (Garthwaite, 2012) . Because the current Medicaid expansion applies to all low-income individuals, not just those with disabilities or children, hospitals and physicians may be facing the largest increase in Medicaid patients since the early years of the program. If the change in the insurance composition of patients leads to a large reduction in revenue, providers may turn to privately insured patients in order to make up for the lost revenue. This paper explores the relationship between the treatment of Medicaid patients at a hospital and …nancial outcomes for privately insured patients. A theoretical model is derived from the Sloan et al. (1978) two-market model, which is typically used to explore situations where private patients are charged higher prices when Medicaid reimbursement rates fall. The Sloan et al. (1978) cost-shifting framework is adapted to the current Medicaid expansion by allowing the quantity of Medicaid treatment to increase and introducing uninsured patients to the analysis, e¤ectively creating a three-market model. Theoretically, an increase in Medicaid patients is associated with a reduction in the amount of privately insured treatment. Private prices increase when a Medicaid expansion is driven by previously uninsured patients, but the change in private price is ambiguous when a Medicaid increase is driven by patients that were privately insured before an expansion.
Empirically testing the implications of the model requires a situation where health insurance coverage for government insured patients increase exogenously. Between 2000 and 2013, California implemented two separate, but continuous county-level programs that provided federal funding to counties that increased health insurance coverage for low-income, uninsured individuals ineligible for California's Medi-Cal program. Variation in the implementation of the health insurance programs is used to test how privately insured patients are impacted by a signi…cant increase in county-insured patients.
Using the subset of counties that implement a health insurance program, …rst-stage regressions show that county health insurance programs signi…cantly increase the amount of county-insured treatment at hospitals. The increase in county-insured patients is associated with a reduction in the quantity of privately insured patients and an increase in the average revenue hospitals receive from each private patient. Additional regressions show that the results are driven by for-pro…t hospitals giving fewer discounts to private health insurance companies. The …ndings are consistent with a theoretical model where Medicaid expansion is driven by previously uninsured patients.
The analysis in the current paper suggests that the ACA promoted growth in Medicaid enrollment may cause hospitals to reduce treatment for privately insured patients. For-pro…t hospitals in particular may increase prices for private patients in response to an increase in Medicaid patients.
It is possible that hospitals will seek out other ways to cover lost revenue as the number of Medicaid patients increase in the near future, such as di¤erentially treating patients based on their health insurance status. In the event that hospitals happen to decrease private quanitity and change private prices in response to the recent increase in Medicaid enrollment, the analysis below provides a framework that can help explain hospital behavior.
The results in the paper can also be used to explain how private consumers in other markets are a¤ected by changes in the quantity of low-income, …xed marginal revenue consumers. Eriksen and Ross (2015) show that the price of rental housing does not change when housing vouchers increase.
Assuming that at least some of the new voucher recipients were previously paying market rents, the empirical …ndings of Eriksen and Ross (2015) can be explained by the theoretical model in the current paper. The three-market model developed below can also explain variation in out-of-state tuition at public universities when faced with pressure to lower admission standards for in-state applicants (Groen and White, 2004 ).
Background

Medicaid Eligibility Expansion and the A¤ordable Care Act
The Patient Protection and A¤ordable Care Act (ACA) was signed into law on March 23, 2010 with the overarching goal to increase health insurance coverage and reduce health care costs. A number of signi…cant health care reforms were part of the ACA, including a requirement that all individuals become covered by health insurance, the formation of health insurance exchanges and eliminating coverage denial for pre-existing conditions (HHS, 2015).
The initial writing of the ACA expanded Medicaid eligibility to include families with e¤ective incomes of less than 138 percent of the Federal Poverty Level, beginning January 1st, 2014. In order to receive federal funding for Medicaid, states have historically had to meet minimum coverage standards and o¤er Medicaid to low-income children, parents, pregnant women and elderly, as well as adults with disabilities (Gruber, 2003) . Coverage for low-income, non-disabled adults has not been required to receive federal funding for Medicaid and the Medicaid eligibility reform in the Medicaid has a low reimbursement rate relative to both Medicare and private insurance (Zuckerman and Goin, 2012) and hospitals may alter their behavior in response to the increase in Medicaid enrollment. If hospitals and physicians observe an increase in low-paying Medicaid patients, they may seek out ways to generate more revenue from other patients that do not have a …xed reim- 1 Medi-Cal and Medicaid are used interchangeably throughout the paper. bursement rate, such as privately insured patients. 2 In the following sections, hospital level data are used to explore the potential relationship between the changes in the treatment of low-income, …xed marginal revenue patients and quantities and prices for privately insured patients.
Related Literature
The current paper adds to the extensive literature exploring the consequences of expansions in
Medicaid eligibility. The Medicaid program expanded in the 1980s to include low-income pregnant women and young children. Cutler and Gruber (1996) use these early expansions targeting women and children to estimate a roughly 50 percent crowd out rate. Dave et al. (forthcoming) potentially explain the source of the crowd out and observe that the probability of a young mother being employed decreases as Medicaid eligibility increases. The eligibility expansions for children are associated with increases in visits to physicians (Currie and Gruber, 1996) and rates of hospitalization (Dafny and Gruber, 2005 
The …rst term in equation (1), p P q P is the revenue a hospital receives from private patients.
The inverse demand function follows the standard assumptions, p q < 0 and p0. (Sloan et al., 1978) .
Assuming that uninsured patients receive the same type of treatment simpli…es the analysis and incorporating a speci…c cost structure for uninsured patients does not change the implications of 5 It is possible that some for-pro…t hospitals also make decisions based on factors other than pro…t, such as the quality of treatment or reputation, but the available hospital data cannot separate which for-pro…t hospitals act in a similar fashion to non-pro…t hospitals. the model. The cost function is increasing in q T , c q > 0, and the marginal cost is non-diminishing,
A hospital cannot choose q M or q U , but will choose the level of q P that maximizes utility. Taking the …rst-order condition of equation (1) with respect to q P yields:
Equation (2) shows that a non-pro…t hospital maximizes utility at q P , where the marginal bene…t of q P equals the marginal cost of treatment, given the hospital treats q M and q U Medicaid and uninsured patients, respectively. In the case that a hospital is only concerned about pro…t, the marginal non-monetary bene…t term, B P q , drops out of equation (2) and the for-pro…t hospital sets marginal revenue equal to marginal cost.
In order to show how a non-pro…t hospital will optimally respond to an increase in Medicaid eligibility, begin with a non-pro…t hospital that is treating the utility maximizing number of private patients, q P . When Medicaid eligibility expands, the eligibility term, M , increases. Intuitively, the expansion will increase the number of Medicaid patients a hospital faces. The increase can come from previously uninsured patients or privately insured patients. Because the hospital treats more patients without private insurance, the hospitals will respond by reducing the number of private patients treated. The optimal change in the quantity of private patients is found by taking the total derivative of equation (2) and solving for
According to equation (3), an increase in Medicaid eligibility will change the optimal number of private patients treated through four channels. The term , cM + q U , represents the change in the marginal cost of non-privately insured patients as a result of the expansion. The term will be zero when marginal cost is constant or a Medicaid expansion is completely driven by previously uninsured patients who do not exhibit moral hazard. In this extreme case, q M = q U . If any moral hazard exists, the term is positive when marginal cost is increasing. 6 The expansion may cause some privately insured patients to switch to Medicaid, changing the 6 There is an implicit assumption that previously uninsured patients do not reduce their levels of treatment after enrolling in Medicaid and q M + q U will never be negative.
marginal revenue curve by p PP +p P q +p P . As patients move from private insurance to Medicaid, the demand and marginal revenue from private patients will decrease, and the term is negative. In the case where there is no crowd out, a Medicaid expansion will not a¤ect the private marginal revenue curve and p PP + p P q + p P will be zero. The non-positive value of p
from the non-negative term, cM + q U , and the numerator of equation (3) is non-negative.
The denominator re ‡ects the condition that marginal bene…t of private patients must remain equal to marginal cost. The marginal revenue decreases when there is an increase in private patients,
, and the term B Pis negative at non-pro…t hospitals by assumption. Taken together, the term, p PP + 2p
qq , is strictly negative. The last term in the denominator, c, re ‡ects the change in marginal cost from treating more private patients and is non-negative by assumption, making the denominator in equation (3) strictly negative.
Under most scenarios, an increase in Medicaid eligibility will be associated with a decrease in the quantity of private patients treated,
when there is no crowd out and either marginal cost is constant, or uninsured patients do not increase health care treatment when they receive Medicaid coverage. If there is no crowd out, the magnitude of the reduction in private patients from a Medicaid expansion will grow as the moral hazard exhibited by uninsured patients, q M + q U , increases. In this scenario, fewer private patients are treated, but the private demand curve is unchanged and the price charged to private patients will increase.
The case of no crowd out at a for-pro…t hospital is seen visually in …gure 1. The for-pro…t hospital faces uninsured and Medicaid patients before deciding the optimal number of private patients to treat (uninsured patients are not depicted in the …gure). The Medicaid expansion increases the treatment of non-private patients at the hospital, depicted by the dashed black line. The private demand curve shifts from D to D 0 , but the slope of the demand curve remains the same. Hospitals will continue to optimally set marginal cost equal to marginal revenue, treat fewer private patients and charge a higher price.
As the rate of crowd out increases, the term q M + q U increases because q M is increasing without a equally sized reduction in q U . An increasing rate of crowd out will increase the numerator of equation (3) The marginal cost will also determine the magnitude of the change in private patients following a Medicaid expansion. Hospitals where marginal costs are increasing at a higher rate will reduce private patients more than hospitals with ‡atter marginal cost curves. For-pro…t hospitals that do not receive a non-monetary bene…t from treating patients will drop the term B P, and reduce private patients more than at comparable non-pro…t hospitals following a Medicaid expansion.
The e¤ect of the Medicaid expansion on private charges is ambiguous when there is crowd out.
The optimal number of private patients unambiguously decreases, but the nature of the private demand curve also changes since there are now fewer privately insured patients. Depending on the nature of the expansion and the change in the elasticity of private demand, it is possible for private charges to rise or fall after an expansion. Figure 2 shows the unique situation where a for-pro…t hospital faces a linear private demand curve and there is perfect crowd out. Perfect crowd out occurs when the increase in marginal cost from treating additional non-private patients, cM + q U , is completely o¤set by the reduction in marginal revenue from the expansion, p
In this case, the reduction in private patients is exactly equal to the increase in Medicaid patients and the total number of patients treated is unchanged. The linearity of the private demand curve causes the price to remain the same before and after the expansion. This unique situation also suggests that it is possible for nonpro…t hospitals to reduce private prices after an expansion, but a comparable for-pro…t hospital could optimally raise prices.
If the parameters of the model above are known, the predictions about quantity and price are straightforward. However, …nding a suitable way to measure hospital prices is less clear. The revenue amount reported in inpatient data do not necessarily re ‡ect the actual amount a hospital is reimbursed after negotiations with insurance companies (Reinhardt, 2006). The actual amount received by a hospital for a service depends on their market power, the number of subscribers in the insurance group, the intensity of treatment and patient outcomes.
Negotiating for a higher reimbursement rate comes at the risk of the insurance carrier dropping the hospital from their network. According to the theoretical model, hospitals facing more Medicaid patients are willing to lose private patients as long as the remaining patients are treated at a higher reimbursement rate. hospitals located in the six counties that applied for HCCI funding, but were rejected. 8 The CMSP counties are omitted. According to …gure 3, there was a slight increase in the average number of 7 The legacy counties are: Alameda, Contra Costa, Kern, Los Angeles, Orange, San Diego, San Francisco, San Mateo, Santa Clara and Ventura. 8 The rejected counties are: Fresno, Merced, Riverside, San Bernardino, Santa Cruz and Tulare. 
Hospital Financial and Utilization Data
The empirical analysis uses the change in county insured patients driven by the HCCI and LIHP to explore how hospitals respond to an increase in low-income, …xed marginal revenue patients.
The O¢ ce of State Health Planning and Development (OSHPD) in California publishes utilization, …nancial and ownership information for every licensed hospital in California. The data is publicly available from 2000 to 2014. One of the primary bene…ts of the data is that each year, the net revenue is reported by insurance type. The net revenue is the actual amount hospitals receive from patients, government programs and third party payers. The data also includes information about hospital operating expenses, gross revenue, total patients, licensed beds and hospital competition to control for hospital characteristics that potentially in ‡uence the prices charged to privately insured patients. to follow similar patterns, with two exceptions. The average total patient days in legacy county hospitals decreased over time, while adoption county hospitals increased patient days. The last row shows the average Herfandahl-Hirshman Index (HHI) using gross revenue in a health facility planning area to construct the HHI. The HHI for both legacy and adoption county hospitals suggest that the average hospital has market power and the HHI has increased over time. However, the HHI in adoption county hospitals are noticeably greater than legacy county hospitals, which is consistent with legacy counties being located in highly populated areas. Licensed Beds, Gross Revenue and Total Operating Expenses are qualitatively similar across the county types.
Empirical Speci…cation
The summary statistics in table 2 show that the average net revenue hospitals received from private patients increase as the number of county insured patients increase. Table 2 is consistent with the theoretical predictions from the model in the previous section, but there are a number of hospital characteristics that can increase private prices and county insured patients simultaneously that must be controlled for.
Using the price of private patients as a dependent variable requires the quantity of private patients to be a regressor. Not only is the coe¢ cient for private quantity biased, but if there is a systematic relationship between the quantity of private and county insured patients, the county insured coe¢ cient will also be biased. Equation (4) begins to mitigate the concerns surrounding the simultaneous relationship between private price and quantity by using the private net revenue p P q P and private net revenue per private patient day p P q P q P as dependent variables:
The coe¢ cient of interest in equation (4), , reports the percentage change in private net revenue or average private net revenue in hospital h when the quantity of county insured patients, q
CN T Y ht
, increases by one percent. The regression includes hospital and year …xed e¤ects and the matrix of controls, Z ht , includes the natural log of a hospital's gross revenue, operating expenses, patient days, licensed beds and HHI in year t.
In order for the results to be consistent with the theoretical predictions, the net revenue per private patient (private price) is expected to increase when the increase in county insured patients is driven by previously uninsured individuals. The expected relationship between private net revenue and county insured patients is less clear. Assuming that the private price increases in response to an increase in county insured patients, the change in net revenue will depend on the relative reduction in the quantity of privately insured patients. A relatively small decrease in private patients, combined with an increase in private prices, will lead to an increase in private net revenue. If the reduction in private patients is large relative to an increase in the private price, it is possible for the net revenue to decrease.
The endogeneity concerns from using the private price and quantity as dependent variables are reduced by using the private net revenue and net revenue per private patient as outcomes. A signi…cant concern remains in equation (4) if the quantity of county insured patients are related to unobservable hospital characteristics that in ‡uence private price or quantity. If a hospital gains a reputation for providing high-quality treatment, the hospital may observe an increase in all types of patients and use their improved reputation to negotiate higher prices with private insurance companies. In this scenario, the coe¢ cient of interest in equation (4) would show that county patients and private prices are positively related, but the coe¢ cient would be capturing the unobservable reputation e¤ect.
To remove some of the bias caused by regressing the private outcomes on the quantity of county insured patients, a …rst stage regression predicts the natural log of county insured patients treated in hospital h in year t with the implementation of the HCCI and LIHP . In equation (5), under the assumption that changes in county insured patients generated from the HCCI and LIHP are unrelated to unobservable determinants of private patient outcomes, " ht . An increase in demand for hospital services that coincides with the implementation of the HCCI and LIHP can lead to an increase in county patients and private prices, but county patients will not be causally related to private outcomes. In the event that a demand shock is driving the results, the quantity of private patients should also increase. To more accurately explore the prevalence of private demand shocks, the the natural log of private patient days will also be used as a dependent variable. Table 3 presents the regression results of the two-stage regressions described in equations (4) The second column shows that a ten percent increase in county insured patient days in a hospital is associated with a 1.8 percent increase in the net revenue the hospital receives from private patients, but the relationship is insigni…cant. In the third column, the results show that the increase in net revenue is driven by an increase in net revenue per private patient. Although the third column may su¤er from endogeneity because the natural log of private patients are used as the dependent variable, there is a relatively small, negative and insigni…cant relationship between private patient days and county insured patient days within a hospital. The last three columns of table 3 support the theoretical predictions of the model.
Regression Results
Another prediction derived from the theoretical model is that for-pro…t hospitals will respond more strongly to changes in …xed marginal revenue patients, compared to similar non-pro…t hospitals. Table 4 provides support for that prediction. In the …rst three columns, the county insured patient day coe¢ cient is reported for unique two-stage regressions corresponding to equations (4) and (5). The natural log of the private net revenue, private net revenue per patient day and private patient days in all hospitals, non-pro…t hospitals or for-pro…t hospitals are used as dependent variables.
The main results from table 3 are reported in the …rst three columns of the …rst row in table 4.
The bottom two rows show the results when non-pro…t and for-pro…t hospitals are examined separately. In non-pro…t hospitals, increases in county insured patients are positively, but insigni…cantly, related to private net revenue, private net revenue per patient day and private patient days.
At for-pro…t hospitals, there is a signi…cant increase in private net revenue per patient day when county insured patients increase. There is a large, but insigni…cant, reduction in private patient days as county insured patients increase. The decrease in private patient days partially o¤sets the increase in private price and causes the relationship between private net revenue and county insured patients at for-pro…t hospitals to be positive, but insigni…cant.
To better understand how hospitals are altering the prices charged to privately insured individuals, the last four columns of table 4 explore how contractual adjustments and capitation revenue from private patients change when county insured patients increase. Contractual adjustments capture the reduction in a private patient's bill due to an agreement with the insurance company. A higher contractual adjustment, all else held equal, suggests that hospitals receive less from insurance companies.
Two-stage regression results using the contractual adjustment amount as the dependent variable are reported in the fourth column table 4. Increases in county insured patients are associated with larger discounts for private insurance companies when all hospitals are included in the regression, but the results are insigni…cant. At for-pro…t hospitals, increasing the number of county insured patients is associated with a signi…cant reduction in contractual adjustments. Results using nonpro…t hospitals are insigni…cant.
The next column shows how county insured patients are related to the average contractual adjustment per private patient. The coe¢ cents mirror the nominal contractual adjustment regressions, but the county insured patient coe¢ cient is only signi…cant in the non-pro…t hospital regression.
The last columns of table 4 explore whether capitation revenue from private managed care patients are related to county insured patients. The amount of capitation revenue per patient decreases as county insured patients increase, but the coe¢ cient is only marginally signi…cant when all hospitals are used in the regression. All other regressions using capitation as the dependent variable are insigni…cant.
The results in table 4 suggest that non-pro…t hospitals may be experiencing an increase in private demand that coincides with increases in county insured patients. Point estimates suggest that there is an increase in private patient days and discounts to insurance companies at non-pro…t hospitals when county insured patients increase. At for-pro…t hospitals, increases in net revenue from private patients do not appear to be driven by an increase in private patients.
If hospitals that experience an increase in county insured patients are attempting to attract all types of patients to the hospital, then increases in county insured patients should be related to outcomes for Medicaid or Medicare patients. Table 5 shows that net revenue for all patients is positively related to county insured patients, but the coe¢ cient is only marginally signi…cant.
County insured patients are unrelated to the net revenue, net revenue per patient day or total patient days for both Medicaid and Medicare patients. These falsi…cation regressions do not rule out the possibility of private demand increasing during the HCCI and LIHP years, but there does not appear to be an increase in Medicare and Medicaid when county patients increase.
Discussion
The theoretical predictions in section 3 show that when there is no crowd out, an increase in the number of Medicaid, or …xed marginal revenue, patients will reduce the number of private patients treated. The reduction will be larger at for-pro…t hospitals compared to non-pro…t hospitals with similar attributes. Prices for privately insured patients will rise when there is no crowd out. If there is crowd out when Medicaid patients increase in a hospital, the theoretical change in prices for private patients is ambiguous. The implications of the model are tested using county insured health insurance programs in California, which provided health insurance for previously uninsured individuals.
The behavior of for-pro…t hospitals is consistent with the theoretical predictions. Increasing county insured patients through the HCCI and LIHP is associated with a signi…cant increase in average net revenue per private patient, an insigni…cant reduction in the quantity of private patient days and an insigni…cant increase in net revenue from private patients. The increase in revenue per patient at for-pro…t hospitals appear to be driven by a reduction in contractual adjustments.
Non-pro…t hospitals do not respond to the increase in county insured patients in the same way as for-pro…t hospitals as the quantity of private patients are positively related to county insurd patients.
There are a number of possible reasons as to why non-pro…ts behave di¤erently than for-pro…ts in the results above. The non-pro…t results may be because private demand increased when the HCCI and LIHP are implemented at non-pro…t hospitals, but not at for-pro…ts. Assuming that a non-pro…t hospital is not capacity constrained, any increase in private demand that occurs during the HCCI and LIHP can lead to an increase in both county insured and private patients, as well as an increase in the net revenue and average net revenue from private patients. The relationship between county insured patients and private quantity and prices found above does not necessarily imply that the current Medicaid expansion will impact private patients in a similar manner. The county level health programs, the HCCI and LIHP, had a …nite time horizon and were considerably smaller than the current Medicaid expansion. The signi…cant and sustained increase in Medicaid patients can impact the behavior of hospitals in ways not discussed above.
Hospitals may become more diligent about reducing costs or alter the wage structure of health care
workers. Garthwaite (2012) …nds that physicians see more Medicaid patients, but for a shorter amount of time, following the implementation of the CHIP program.
The di¤erential response of non-pro…t and for-pro…t hospitals to an increase in county insured patients is a potentially important …nding for policy makers that are working to minimize negative consequences associated with the ACA. According to the theoretical model and empirical results, non-pro…t hospitals appear to value the potential loss from treating fewer private patients more than for-pro…t hospitals. Providing incentives for new Medicaid patients to seek out treatment at non-pro…t hospitals, as opposed to for-pro…t hospitals, can potentially mitigate negative outcomes for private patients. A signi…cant fraction of hospitals are non-pro…t, so it is possible to provide this type of incentive without restricting the availability of health care for most Medicaid patients.
Policy makers would also need to ensure that treatment quality did not su¤er if the majority of new Medicaid patients were treated at non-pro…t hospitals.
Conclusion
Motivated by states following the ACA and expanding Medicaid eligibility to include all low-income individuals, this paper explores how the quantity and price charged to privately insured patients changes when the number of low-paying, government insured patients in a hospital rise. There is a signi…cant literature examining the consequences of changes to the Medicaid program, but before the recent expansion, there has been a limited incentive to study how large scale increases in eligibility a¤ect private patients. After adding uninsured patients to a mixed-economy model, it is shown that hospitals optimally reduce treatment to private patients and increase charges when there is an increase in Medicaid enrollment driven by previously uninsured patients. The magnitude of the changes are larger at for-pro…t hospitals, compared to similar non-pro…t hospitals. When new enrollment in Medicaid crowds out private insurance, there is still a reduction in private treatment, but the predicted change in prices to private patients is ambiguous.
The predictions of the model are tested using hospital level data from California hospitals and exploiting the variation in the timing and location of county programs that increased health insurance coverage for low-income, uninsured individuals. The empirical results are largely consistent with the theoretical predictions and show that the average net revenue per private patient increases when the treatment of county insured patients increase through the HCCI and LIHP. There is a small, insigni…cant reduction in the quantity of private patients associated with the county insured increase, leading to an overall increase in private net revenue when county insured patients rise.
Additional regressions show that behavior at for-pro…t hospitals is more consistent with theoretical predictions that non-pro…t hospitals. The private price increase at for-pro…t hospitals appears to be driven by fewer discounts to private insurance companies during the billing process. The nonpro…t results that do not align with theory may be because non-pro…t hospitals are experiencing a continual increase in demand from privately insured individuals, the e¤ect of the HCCI and LIHP is not as strong at non-pro…t hospitals or non-pro…t hospitals have a complex utility function that is not captured in the theoretical model. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors clustered at the hospital in parentheses. Each cell reports the coe¢ cient of the natural log of county insured patient days for a unique two-stage regression.
The dependent variable corresponds with the variables described in the columns and the regressions are strati…ed based on whether the hospital is a non-pro…t or for-pro…t hospital. All regressions include controls and hospital and year …xed e¤ects and are weighted by the average number of patient days. 
